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In this short essay, I will draw on my own experiences in the Inter-American system for
the protection of human rights in analyzing some of the options available today to victims of the
Armenian Genocide during World War I. Although the Inter-American human rights system has
been more expansive than the European in the interpretation of its reparations authority, I believe
that recent developments in the European human rights system, together with recognized
international principles regarding victim reparations, provide a functional framework for possible
human rights remedies. While reconciliation may be an admirable long-term goal, recognition
and acceptance of state responsibility must precede any such speculative future.
For purposes of this paper, I accept as incontrovertible the historic evidence of the
Armenian genocide.1 While I recognize that there is resistance, sometimes adamant, to this
conclusion among both some governments and some scholars, the project of this paper is not to
dispute that issue, but to move beyond it to a realistic appraisal of appropriate remedies for the
victims, using the framework of international human rights law. My proposals do not
contemplate criminal prosecution; notions of individual responsibility, the non-retroactive
jurisdiction of new international criminal tribunals, and the passage of time make that alternative
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unrealistic if not impossible, in my view. Instead, I will draw on principles of restorative justice
to fashion what I believe to be a viable reparations framework for victims, particularly those who
lost property, land and buildings, during the period of the genocide.
I also assume, for the purposes of this paper, the fundamental notion in human rights law
that such rights are not effective and fully realized until there are full and adequate remedies for
their violation: there is no effective right without an effective remedy. In contrast to this
principle, however, is the reality that human rights law has not dealt well in the past with mass
atrocity; such atrocities seem to lie within the particular ambit of criminal law. Human rights law
has tended to focus instead more on individual than collective or group wrongs, with precious
few exceptions.
Finally, I am a teacher of law, but I am a clinical practitioner as well. I have taught and
practiced international human rights law with students for more than twenty years, working on
real cases with real clients, with lives sometimes at stake. Mine is not the theoretical realm of the
pure academic, but the real world of blood and tears, of deep psychological damage and loss, and
hopefully, of restoration and justice for victims and survivors.
I will explore this topic through three related perspectives. First, I will examine the
general human rights framework of relevant U.N. principles relating to the legal framework of
remedies for victims of mass atrocity. Second, I will discuss what I believe to be analogous
litigation to that faced by victims of the Armenian genocide in the Inter-American system, using
the case of Arbenz v. Guatemala, a case litigated and settled in that system by my own
International Human Rights Law Clinic. Finally, I will offer some suggestions as to how those
frameworks and experience might be found to apply in the European system for human rights
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protection, where both Turkey and Armenia are parties to the European Convention on Human
Rights.
1. The UN Human Rights Law Framework of Remedies for Victims of Mass Atrocity
There are two major human rights documents adopted by the United Nations that
resonate with the history of the Armenian genocide and the failure of Turkey to recognize its
international legal responsibility for it. The first carries the somewhat ponderous name of Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (hereafter, “Basic Principles”), adopted by resolution of the UN General
Assembly in 2006.2 The second document is the updated Principles for the Protection and
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (hereafter,
“Principles to Combat Impunity”), adopted in 2005 by what was then called the UN Commission
on Human Rights.3
In her excellent treatise on remedies for human rights violations, Professor Dinah Shelton
reminds us of a basic premise too often forgotten: human rights obligations are not the mutual
obligations of state to state, as in most multi-lateral treaties,4 but the still-radical notion that a
2
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state in breach of its human rights obligations guarantees those rights to human beings, whether
individually or collectively.5
Let us turn then to the relevant provisions of the Principles to Combat Impunity. The
Armenian genocide is, without question, a situation of impunity, where a state has failed to
recognize its responsibility to investigate and take appropriate measures to remedy the wrong.
Thus, Principle 2 applies. It provides for an inalienable right to the truth:
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the
perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through
massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise
of the right to the truth provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.6

Similarly, Principle 3, which calls for a duty to preserve memory, also applies. It
provides:
A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be
ensured by appropriate measures in fulfillment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other
evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge
of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from
extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist
arguments.7

A corollary of the third principle, I would argue, is the obligation of the restoration of
historical memory when that memory has been repressed or ignored. The restoration of historical
memory is suggested in Principle 4, on the victims’ right to know:

adopting the longstanding work of the International Law Commission on its draft principles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. For a particularly helpful exposition of the law on reparation for state
injuries in Articles 34 through 39, including numerous international cases, see the draft articles with commentary in
the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected. See, e.g., a case from the
International Court of Justice in which the Court found that Thailand was under an obligation to “restore to
Cambodia any objects . . . which may, since the date of the occupation of the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have
been removed from the Temple or the Temple area by the Thai authorities.” Case concerning the Temple of Preah
Videar (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962: I.CJ. Reports 1962, p. 6, at p. 37.
5
Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law 47-48 (2005).
6
Principles to Combat Impunity, supra note 3.
7
Ibid.
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Irrespective of any legal proceedings, victims and their families have the imprescriptible right to
know the truth about the circumstances in which violations took place and, in the event of death or
disappearance, the victims’ fate.8

The right to know includes, the drafting commentary suggests, the importance of broad
participation of the victims themselves in deliberations about the collective right to know. Those
deliberations may be judicial in nature, or through other administrative bodies such as truth
commissions or other commissions of inquiry, as suggested elsewhere in the Principles,
particularly Principle 32.9
Finally, I would point to Principle 34, which sets out the recognized framework of the
victims’ right to reparations, similar to what we refer to as “damages” after a favorable judgment
for the plaintiff in civil law suits in the United States. The right to reparation includes “all
injuries suffered by victims; it shall include measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
and satisfaction as provided by international law.”10 Principle 34, in its first paragraph, notes that
remedies must be “readily available, prompt and effective.” Delay in a remedy, however, does
not negate the necessity for negation of other requirements. Ideally, the Commentary further
suggests, the program for reparations “should be ‘complete’ in the sense that the class of
beneficiaries coincides with the whole class of victims.”11
Similar sentiments, particularly on reparations, are reflected in the Basic Principles.
Principle 15, in Section IX on Reparation for Harm Suffered, reads, in part:

8

Ibid. Imprescriptibility, in this context, means that the right may not be extinguished by the passage of time, or by
efforts of the offending state to set a statute of limitations. Principle 4 also mentions disappearance, a phenomenon
that occurred with frequency during the Armenian genocide. The International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance is the most recent UN multilateral human rights treaty, entering into force in
December of 2010. Armenia and 32 other countries are parties to the Convention as of 2 July 2012; Turkey and the
United States have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.
9
Commentary to the Principles on Impunity, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 7, 17-19.
10
Principles on Impunity, supra note 2. Definitions and scope of the various terms used in the reparations
framework are set out in greater detail in Principles 31-38, the commentary and the parallel Responsibilities of States
for Wrongful Acts, supra note 4, at 34-39.
11
Commentary to the Principles on Impunity, supra note 3, at ¶ 58(a).
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Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by redressing gross
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian
law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. In
accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide
reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian
law. ***12

That reparation, the Basic Principles go on to provide, may be in the form of restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and/or guarantees of non-repetition.13

2. Restoration of Historical Memory and Honor in the Inter-American Human
Rights System: The Case of Árbenz v. Guatemala
This section recounts the work of students and professors in the International Human
Rights Law Clinic at American University, which works extensively in the Inter-American
human rights system. Over five years, from 2006 through 2011, we represented the descendants
– wife, children and grandchildren – of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán in a case against the state of
Guatemala. Jacobo Árbenz was elected as Guatemala's constitutional president in 1951. On June
27, 1954, he was overthrown in a military coup d'état, and the de facto government confiscated
his property and awarded it to the State. He died in exile on January 27, 1971. The forcible
removal of President Árbenz led to almost 40 years of instability that saw chaos, violent civil
war, repression, genocide, and gross violations of human rights in that country. Guatemala
remained under repressive military rule until the signing of peace accords in 1996.
On December 27, 1999, frustrated by repeated attempts to gain back their property and
honor in Guatemala’s domestic legal system, and years of inaction by the government, President
Arbenz’ next of kin, acting without counsel, lodged a complaint with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (hereafter “IACHR” or “Commission”), with headquarters in
Washington, DC. That complaint was declared admissible by the Commission on March 14,
12
13

Basic Principles, supra note 2, at 7.
Id, at 7, Principles 19-23. The framework for reparations is thus repeated a third time.
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2006.14 That decision extends the jurisdiction of the Commission well beyond the time that
Guatemala had become a party to the American Convention on Human Rights, back to the
original wrong in 1954. It did so by finding that the wrong was endorsed after Guatemala had
ratified the American Convention by the actions of its Constitutional Court in 1996, when it
agreed with the family that the original decrees of the military government confiscating their
property were improper and illegal. Moreover, the Commission found, “the effects of the
confiscation of President Árbenz’s property have remained constant over time,” making the
human rights violation one of a continuing nature, before and after Guatemala signed into the
system.15
The Árbenz family sought legal representation from the Human Rights Clinic during the
summer of 2006. In a working meeting at the IACHR on October 20, 2006, the parties agreed to
begin efforts to reach a possible friendly settlement of the case. The case moved forward on two
tracks, one pursuing the ongoing litigation on the merits and one seeking ways to settle the
matter to the satisfaction of both parties. This resulted in ongoing correspondence with the
Guatemalan government’s human rights office, as well as a series of meetings over the next five
years, formal and informal, at the Commission.
A friendly settlement was reached in the spring of 2011, and an agreement embodying
that decision was signed on May 19, 2011, in a meeting that took place at the Commission's
headquarters in Washington. The State recognized its international responsibility for “failing to
comply with its obligation to guarantee, respect, and protect the human rights of the victims to a
fair trial, to property, to equal protection before the law, and to judicial protection, which are

14

Arbenz v. Guatemala, Report No. 27/06, March 14, 2006, available at
<www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2006eng/GUATEMALA.569.99eng.htm>, visited on 3 July 2012.
15
Id. at ¶¶ 44-46.
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protected in the American Convention on Human Rights and which were violated against former
President Juan Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, his wife and his children.”16
The agreement is unique in providing multiple forms of reparations for the next of kin of
President Árbenz. All are firmly grounded in the principles set out in the first section of this
paper: the right to know and the restoration of historical memory, as well as family honor and
dignity. The agreement included a commitment by the government to hold a public ceremony
recognizing its responsibility and to present a letter of apology to the next of kin; to name a hall
of the National Museum of History and the highway to the Atlantic after the former president; to
revise the basic national school curriculum; to establish a degree program in Human Rights,
Pluriculturalism, and Reconciliation of Indigenous Peoples; to hold a photographic exhibition on
President Árbenz and his legacy at the National Museum of History; to recover the wealth of
photographs of the Árbenz family; to publish a book of photos; to reissue a biography on
President Árbenz by his wife; and to prepare and publish a new biography of the former
President and issue a series of postage stamps in his honor.17
All of these remedies are relevant to the Armenian genocide for at least four significant
reasons. First, the settlement was truly friendly. The passage of time, from 1954 to the present,
had changed the composition and demeanor of the Guatemalan government and made it more
disposed to recognize its historical error in the overthrow of the Árbenz government. The
settlement was a win-win remedy, with all parties satisfied with the agreed outcome, as
contrasted with the winner-take-all outcomes of contentious litigation, which might have
proceeded, at great cost to all, in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

16

By agreement of the parties, the agreement itself remains confidential. See, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Press Release, IACHR Satisfied with Settlement Agreement in Arbenz Case Involving Guatemala,
May 20, 2011.
17
Ibid.
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Second, as noted above, the agreement made concrete many elements of what the law and
principles of human rights remedies calls “satisfaction.” These non-monetary remedies were
available not through adjudication but through the creativity of the family and the Guatemalan
government in designing its elements. Third, and perhaps most important, the non-monetary
reparations not only made clear the acceptance of state responsibility, but made concrete the
ways in which human rights remedies could restore historical memory and dignity, both of which
had been effectively erased from Guatemalan culture.
Fourth, many scholars would argue that these remedies are more extensive than what has
been the historical willingness of the European Court of Human Rights to apply a similar model
of reparations in this region. And yet, there is no impediment to the European Court’s application
of Article 41’s “just satisfaction” provision to violations of the European Convention,
particularly under the new pilot judgment procedure set out in the following section.
3. The European Court of Human Rights Pilot Judgment Program: Broniowski v.
Poland as a Possible Model for the Armenian Genocide

In 2004, the European Court of Human Rights began a new procedure to deal with its
now prodigious backlog of pending cases, many of which involve Turkey.18 The friendly
settlement decision in one of the early pilot judgment cases, Broniowski v. Poland,19 provides a
possible model to deal with the Armenian genocide, extending the rationale and creativity of

18

Philip Leach, Helen Hardman & Svetlana Stephenson, ‘Can the European Court’s Pilot Judgment Procedure Help
Resolve Systemic Human Rights Violations? Burdov and the Failure to Implement Domestic Court Decisions in
Russia,’ 10 Human Rights Law Review 346 (2010). Further support for this view of the powers of the European
Court is suggested in Valerio Colandrea, ‘On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific
Non-monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases,’ 7 Human
Rights Law Review 396 (2007); and more generally in Thomas Antkowiak, ‘An Emerging Mandate for
International Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice,’ 47 Stanford Journal of International Law
279 (2011).
19
Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, Just Satisfaction/Friendly Settlement, 29 Sept. 2005, reported at
<sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/Hof.nsf/e4ca7ef017f8c045c1256849004787f5/b9159ec7b98e456cc1257088002e1bdc?
OpenDocument>, visited on 3 July 2012.
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reparations outcomes from the Arbenz case into Europe. The settlement provides that Poland
accept its responsibility to a group estimated at 80,000 victims of lost property, abandoned
between 1944 and 1953 in the Bug River region of Poland after the Nazi invasion of World War
II. The Polish government had passed a new law in July of 2005, setting the ceiling for
compensation to victims of the Bug River property loss at 20 per cent of its original value, thus
attempting to avoid the financial burdens of its historical responsibility to those victims who had
lost property so many years ago. By taking this contemporary action in violation of human
rights, the government had given validity to the historical wrong, thus extending its
responsibility back through history to the 1940s and ‘50s.
As part of the friendly settlement on behalf of the collective group of victims, the Polish
Government undertook the following:





to implement as rapidly as possible all the necessary measures in terms of domestic law
and practice to secure the implementation of the property right in question in respect of
the remaining Bug River claimants or provide them with equivalent redress in lieu;
to intensify their endeavors to make the new Bug River legislation effective and to
improve the practical operation of the mechanism designed to provide the Bug River
claimants with compensation;
to ensure that the relevant State agencies do not hinder the Bug River claimants in
enforcing their "right to credit"; and
to make available to the remaining Bug River claimants some form of redress for any
material or non-material damage caused to them by the defective operation of the Bug
River legislative scheme.20

The analogy of this case to the Armenian losses in Turkey should be obvious. If, as in the
Broniowski and Arbenz cases, one can find a parallel contemporary wrong that perpetuates the
historical wrong of Turkey against the Armenians, an effective and full remedy could be found in
the European Court of Human Rights. On the second day of the conference in Beirut, Turkish
historian Prof. Akçam Taner, from Clark University in the United States, described his historical
20

Council of Europe, Press Release, European Court of Human Rights - Grand chamber Friendly Settlement
judgment Broniowski v. Poland 496(2005), at <wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=923573&Site=COE>, visited on 3 July
2012.
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research showing that the Turkish government used the ruse of telling victims of property losses
during the genocide that they were holding the property “in trust” for them. If this fabrication
were to be challenged in contemporary Turkish courts, the scenario of Broniowski might be
replicated.
4. Conclusion
The Armenian genocide occurred long ago, and is largely forgotten in the everyday life
of Europeans and Americans, but it lives on in the memories of the victims, whose losses were
devastating, both financial and emotional, as well as prolonged diaspora. The regime of human
rights provides a structure by which memory can be restored and preserved; the structures of the
principles set out here make clear that it is the role of human rights law never to forget. It is true,
as set out above, that human rights law does not deal well with mass atrocity in practice. Perhaps
mass atrocity itself challenges our conceptions of justice, whether retributive or restorative.21 It is
our responsibility, however, to fashion adequate and effective reparations for human rights
victims, even when, by historic inaction and denial, they cannot be prompt. In time, justice calls
for action.
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valuable tools to the Armenian community in constructing an effective and adequate reparations regime.
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